ts 
2.4-9 


VTFR  TP  A  "M 

J.    ).    ,       -•       .-J  JL  \  Jl  v>  JL  \ 

REVOLUTION 


ARD 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


BEAUMARCHAIS 


AND    THE 


AMERICAN   REVOLUTION 


BY 

BLANCHE   EVANS    HAZARD 


A    PRIZE    ESSAY    PUBLISHED    BY    THE   GENERAL   SOCIETY 
OF   THE   DAUGHTERS   OF   THE    REVOLUTION 


EDWIN  L.  SLOCOMB,  THE  PRINTER 

BOSTON,  MASS. 

1910 


THE  FAILURE  OF  AMERICANS 
TO  APPRECIATE  THE  TRUE 
NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  THE 
SERVICES  OF  BEAUMARCHAIS  IN 
THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 


E 

a^ 

H 


Contents 


I.  INTRODUCTION  —  EXPLAINING  AIMS,  METHOD  OF  TREATMENT,  AND 
OPPOSING  VIEWS. 

II.  BRIEF  STATEMENT  OF  MERE  FACTS  IN  CHRONOLOGICAL  ORDER. 

III.  POSITION  OF  THE  FRENCH  GOVERNMENT. 

IV.  POSITION  AND  MOTIVES  OF  BFAUMARCHAIS. 
V.  POSITION  OF  THE  CONTINENTAL  CONGRESS. 

VI.  MISUNDERSTANDINGS  AND  CONSEQUENCES. 


895508 


Bibliography  and  Key  for  Quoted  References 


1.  Bettelheim,  Anton:    Beaumarchais,  eine  biogra- 

phie.      1886. 

2.  Bolles,  Albert  Sidney:   Financial   History  of  the 

United  States. 

Vol.  I.     1774-1789.     1884. 

3.  Bullock,   Charles   J.  :    Monetary   History   of  the 

United  States.     1900. 

4.  Congressional  Records  for  1814,  1816,  1824  and 

1835- 

5.  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  United  States. 

6.  Doniol,  Henri  :    Histoire  de  la  Participation  de 

la  France  a  1'e'tablissement  des  Etats  Unis 
d'Amerique.      1886-92. 

7.  Durand,  John:   New  Materials  for  the  History  of 

the  American  Revolution.     i&Sg. 

8.  La  Grande  Encyclopedic  :   Article  on  Beaumar- 

chais. 

9.  Lee,  Charles  H.  :    A  Vindication  of  Arthur  Lee. 
10.     Lome'nie,  Louis  de  :    Beaumarchais  et  son  Temps. 


n.     Lowell,  Edward  J.  :    In  Winsor's  Narrative  and 
Critical  History,  Vol.  VII. 

12.  North    American    Review,    Vol.   LXXXIV.,   for 

1857- 

13.  Perkins,  James  Breck:    France  under  Louis  XV. 

1897. 

14.  Pitkin,  Timothy  :   Political  and  Civil   History  of 

the  United  States.     1828. 

15.  Rosenthal,  Lewis  :    America  and  France.      1882. 
1  6.     Stille\  Charles  J.  :   Beaumarchais  and  "The  Lost 

Million."     1887. 


Bet. 
Bol. 

Bui. 
Cong.  Rec. 

Dip.  Cor. 
Don. 

Dur. 
Ency. 

Lee. 

Lom. 

N.  C.  H. 

N.  Amer.  Rev. 

Per. 

Pit. 

Ros. 

Stille'. 


In  the  winter  of  1906  -  1907,  the  General  Society  of 
the  Daughters  of  the  Revolution  offered  a  prize  of  fifty  dollars 
in  gold  for  the  best  essay  which  should  be  submitted  on  any 
phase  of  the  American  Revolution.  The  competition  was 
open  to  members  of  the  class  of  1907  in  any  of  our  colleges 
for  women. 

The  judges  awarded  this  prize  to  BLANCHE  EVANS 
HAZARD  of  Radcliffe  College,  and  the  gold  coins,  enclosed 
in  a  blue  and  buff  case,  were  presented  to  her  at  the  Class 
Day  exercises  of  the  Radcliffe  graduates  of  1907. 

By  vote  of  the  Society,  the  accepted  essay  was  to  be 
owned  and  published  by  the  General  Society  of  the  Daugh- 
ters of  the  Revolution,  and  it  is  herewith  given  to  the  public 
so  that  the  younger  and  older  students  of  American  History 
may  know  more  of  the  problems  and  patriotism  of  their 
revolutionary  forefathers. 


I. 

Introduction 


"  Sous1  la  raison  sociale  Roderigue,  Hortalez  et  Cie,  Beaumarchais 
avait  crde'  une  flottille  de  quarante  navires  dont  le  premier  emploi  fut 
le  ravitaillement,  secretement  encourage"  pas  Louis  XVI.,  des  insurgents 
d'Amdrique.  Bien  qu'il  ait  re£u  plus  tard  les  felicitations  publiques  du 
Congres,  il  engagea  dans  cette  operation  une  grosse  somme  (plus  de 
cinq  millions)  dont,  apres  d'interminables  debats  ses  he'ritiers  ne  purent 
recouvrer  qu'une  faible  part." 

For  Americans  of  today  this  statement  needs  explanation  to  make 
it  seem  credible  to  themselves,  or  creditable  to  their  revolutionary  fore- 
fathers. The  Frenchman  who  makes  the  statement  has  the  facts  upon 
his  side.2  They  seem  either  to  imply  monstrous  ingratitude  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  or  to  impugn  the  character  of  Beaumarchais  and 
the  French  government  for  having  deserved  such  treatment. 

The  position  of  all  three  parties  during  the  years  from  1775  to 
1778,  their  aims,  and  their  motives,  need  to  be  studied  impartially,  tak- 
ing into  account  meanwhile  the  inevitable  consequences  of  distance,  of 
enforced  secrecy,  and  of  racial  differences  in  speech  and  temper,  in  con- 
fusing the  ideas  and  actions  of  the  three  parties  involved. 

Without  this  explanation,  it  is  hard  to  understand  the  action  of  the 
United  States  in  settling  the  claims  of  Beaumarchais  so  tardily,  even 
unwillingly,  and  then  only  partially,  while  they  .gave  unstinted  and 
grateful  appreciation  to  Lafayette  and  other  foreigners  who  aided  them 
in  the  Revolution. 


Each  of  the  parties  involved  finds  its  advocates  and  accusers.  Ex- 
cept for  Lomenie,  however,  no  one  tries  to  exonerate  Beaumarchais 
wholly.  Of  those  who  think  that  the  French  government,  both  under 
the  monarchy  and  under  the  Republic,  was  consciously  and  purposely  in 
the  wrong,  Stille  appears  to  be  the  only  representative  among  recent 
writers.  He,  however,  does  not  seem  to  maintain  his  unique  position 
in  which  he  attempts  not  only  to  blame  the  French  government  severe- 
ly, but  to  free  the  Continental  Congress  from  all  just  cause  of  cen- 
sure. If  his  book  were  not  in  existence,  one  could  say  that  modern 
historians  acknowledge,  although  they  regret,  and  endeavor  to  under- 
stand, the  failure  of  the  American  colonial  and  federal  government  to 
appreciate  the  true  nature  and  extent  of  Beaumarchais's  services  to  the 
American  Colonies  during  the  Revolutionary  War. 


La  Grande  Encyclopedic,  Vol.   V,  p.  1037. 
disputes  this. 


II. 

Brief  statement  of  mere  facts  of  the  case 
in  chronological  order 


In  1775,  Beaumarchais,  as  an  agent  in  England  for  the  French  gov- 
ernment entrusted  with  a  matter  of  minor  importance,  learned  much 
about  the  conditions  in  the  American  colonies  and  of  the  English  hopes 
and  fears  concerning  them.  By  his  acquaintance  with  Lord  Rochford, 
James  Wilkes,  and  Arthur  Lee  of  Virginia,  he  was  put  in  the  way  of 
hearing  a  great  variety  of  opinions.  This  intelligence  he  transmitted 
to  Louis  XVI  and  his  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Vergennes,  in  fre- 
quent, urgent  letters.  He  argued  that  it  was  for  the  best  interests  of 
France  to  aid  the  colonies  secretly,  and  suggested  himself  as  the  agent. 

By  June  of  1776,  Beaumarchais  had  established  a  business  house 
in  the  Faubourg  du  Temple  in  Paris,  under  the  name  of  Roderigue 
Hfortalez  &  Company.  His  capital  included  not  only  private  sub- 
scriptions, but  a  million  francs  from  the  public  treasury  of  France1 
and  one  million  livres  from  the  Spanish  government,  for  which  sums  he 
had  given  his  personal  receipts.2  He  also  received  a  million  francs 
from  the  farmers-general  of  France  in  the  form  of  an  advance  loan  on 
tobacco  which  was  to  be  imported  from  the  American  colonies.  Beau- 
marchais assumed  the  financial  and  political  risks8  of  this  whole  un- 
dertaking, for  by  agreement,  the  French  government  was  to  be  free 
to  disavow  any  connection  with  Hortalez  &  Company. 

In  July  of  1776,  Beaumarchais  made  the  acquaintance  of  Silas 
Deane,  the  agent  sent  by  the  Continental  Congress  at  Philadelphia  to 
raise  funds  and  secure  arms  for  the  colonies.  Deane  ordered  arms 
and  ammunition  to  equip  25,000  soldiers,  agreeing  in  regular  form  upon 
the  terms  of  payment.4  The  goods,  shipped  in  various  lots5  to  dif- 
ferent ports  in  the  colonies  and  received  in  due  time,  were  carefully 
examined,  but  not  formally  acknowledged  by  the  Continental  Congress. 
This  body  delayed  sending  cargoes  in  return.8  No  payment  with  the 
exception  of  300,000  francs  had  been  made  up  to  the  summer  of  1778.* 
Meanwhile  in  1776,  and  again  before  1778,  Vergennes  had  openly  de- 
nied that  the  French  government  was  aiding  the  rebellious  colonies  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  although  he  admitted  that  Beaumarchais  had  been 
allowed  to  buy  some  of  his  ammunition  from  the  government  arsenals.8 

In  1777,  the  American  commissioners,  Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee, 
asked  the  French  government  for  ships,  men,  and  ammunition.  Ver- 
gennes rejected  this  proposed  "breach  of  neutrality  with  England"9  but 
obtained  a  loan  of  money  for  them  on  condition  of  strict  secrecy. 


1.  Rosenthal,  p.   20-1. 

2.  Text  in  Lomfenie,  p.  275  &  in  Dur.  pp.  89-90. 

3.  Dur.  p.  101. 

4.  Dur.  pp.   95-6,   N.   C.  H.  p.   71  Cf.   StlUg,   p.  28. 

5.  Dur.    p.    10?. 
C.  Bol.  p.   224. 

7.  N.  C.  H.  p.  31. 

8.  Bol.    p.    224. 

9.  Boi.  p.   228. 

13 


In  taking  the  side  of  the  American  colonies  openly  in  the  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce  in  1778,  the  French  government  took  away  the 
special  raison  d'etre  of  Beaurdarchais's  firm  and  its  business  trans- 
actions. Yet  by  this  time  he  was  employing  a  fleet10  of  twelve  mer- 
chant vessels,  and  he  continued  to  send  goods  during  the  later  years 
of  the  war. 

The  American  colonies  owed  the  firm  of  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co. 
over  five  million  livres  or  francs  in  1778.  They  appeared  to  acknowl- 
edge this  indebtedness  by  promising  to  pay  two  million  livres  of  it 
through  Mr.  Grand,  the  banker,  in  1777,  and  three  million  mbre  in 
1778."  In  answer  to  remonstrances,  they  made  a  new  contract12  in 
1779,  and  fulfilled  its  terms  by  drawing  bills  of  exchange  upon  Frank- 
lin. He  met  the  bills  in  Paris,  stipulating13  with  the  Continental  Con- 
gress that  they  should  furnish  provisions  for  the  king's  forces  in  A- 
merica,14  and  got  his  money  in  turn  from  the  French  government  to  pay 
Beaumarchais. 

•Meanwhile  the  old  debt15  for  goods  sent  before  1778  was  unpaid,18 
and  both  the  efforts  of  Beaumarchais' s  agent  in  Philadelphia  and 
the  pleas  of  the  sole  member  of  the  firm  were  inadequate  to  the  task 
of  making  the  Continental  Congress,  or  any  later  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  pay  the  debt  which  Alexander  Hamilton  in  1793  had 
said  amounted  to  2,280,000  francs.17  The  claims  of  Beaumarchais 
were  unsettled  at  his  death  in  1799,  were  pressed  by  his  heirs,  discussed 
by  Congress  in  1814,  1824  and  1828,  and  finally  paid,  not 
in  full  but  at  one-third  of  Hamilton's  estimate,  in  i83518  when 
the  "heirs  of  Beaumarchais  had  the  option  of  taking  800,000  francs  or 
nothing."19 


10.  Dur.  p.  138. 

11.  N.  C.  II.  p.     71. 

12.  N.  C.  H.  p.  32. 

13.  Bol.  pp.  240  &  246,  &  Dip.  Corres.  of  U.  S.,  Dec.  1780,  pp.  181  and  182. 

14.  Bol.  p.  240. 

15.  N.   C.   H.  p.  32,   note. 

16.  Cf.    Stille,    p.    48,   who   is   the  authority   for  a    statement  that   Beaumarchais 

received  four  millions  in  payment  from  the  United  States. 

17.  Dur.  p.  156  &  153.     Lee  had  decided  in  1787  that  Beaumarchais  actually  owed 

the  CJ.   S.  1,800,000  francs. 

18.  Bol.   p.   240. 

19.  Dur.  p.  156. 

14 


III. 

Position  of  the  French  Government 


The  French  government  had  no  desire  to  aid  the  cause  of  the  col- 
onies in  the  American  Revolution,  except  the  purely  selfish  one1  based 
upon  a  hope  of  gaining-  an  opportunity  for  indirect  warfare  upon 
England. 

After  the  Peace  of  Paris  of  1763,  France  and  England  had  re- 
mained nominally  at  peace,  France  smarting  under  the  loss  of  India 
and  Canada,  humiliated  by  England's  tone  and  temper,  chagrined  by 
the  prosperity  of  her  rival  on  sea  and  land.  The  remark2  of  Count 
de  Vergennes,  when  he  heard  of  the  loss  of  Canada,  to  the  effect  that 
the  English  had  overshot  their  mark,  and  would  soon  have  rebellious 
colonies  on  their  hands,  was  not  so  much  the  prophecy  of  a  seer  as  the 
ill  wish  of  a  defeated  rival. 

The  rebellion  of  the  American  colonies  of  England  was  welcomed 
by  the  French  government  therefore,  with  positive  joy,  which  was 
scarcely  concealed,  and  restrained  only  by  the  serious  condition  of  the 
French  treasury  which  made  Turgot  doggedly  insist  that  there  should 
be  no  war. 

Turgot  maintained  his  peace  policy  with  cool-headed  repression  of 
feeling.  "Vergennes,  equally  cool  and  withal  discreet,  was  not  so  har- 
moniously endowed  by  nature,  as  he  burned  for  revenge  and  for  the 
humiliation  of  Great  Britain."  He  was  "still  possessed  of  sufficient 
caution  to  wait  until  France  could  strike  a  decisive  blow."  Turgot 
thought  that  the  subjugation  of  the  colonies  by  England  would  be  best 
for  France,  since  he  believed  that  the  discontented  colonies  after  their 
defeat  would  be  a  constant  thorn  in  England's  flesh.  He  even  owned 
to  a  distant  hope  of  regaining  Canada,3  when.  England  became  weary 
of  holding  unwilling  colonies.  He  did  not  give  any  weight,  however, 
to  Beaumarchais's  prophecy4  that  the  English,  if  beaten  by  the  col- 
onies, would  compensate  themselves  by  an  attack  upon  the  French  in- 
sular possessions  in  America  ;5  vet  h^  did  fear  that  if  the  colonists  were 
victorious  they  would  revolutionize  commerce  and  pnl'ti^n  nil  ^yprj^"* 
world.  Turgot's  hope,  then,  was  that  the  colonies  would  be  sufficiently 
successful  to  tri.ghten  England  and  cost  her  dear,  without  gaining 
their  freedom.  Knowing  this,  as  we  do,  from  his  own 
statements,  his  propositions  bear  no  friendly,  altruistic  significance.6 
He  suggested  that  a  number  of  retired  French  officers  taken  into  the 
service  of  the  colonial  armv  might  be  of  use  to  the  colonies,  and  that 


1.  'Lorn.  p.   259,  Doniol,  I,  280.   N.  C.   H.   p.   25. 

2.  For  this    accredited   remark   I    have   lound   no  original   source.      Frof.    H,dward 

Channing  has  traced  it  to  Choiseul. 

3.  N.  C.  H.  p.   25. 

4.  Dur.    p.    79-80. 

5.  N.  C.  H.   7.   25  and  L,om.  pp.  202-5. 

6  In  this,  most  writers  seem  to  agree  with  Stille  in  condemning  the  Fr.  govt.  or 
;it  least  in  refusing  to  be  blinded  as  to  its  real  purpose  in  aiding  the 
colonies. 

17 


their  private  letters7  home  would  give  all  the  information  desirable 
without  compromising  the  French  ministry.  He  was  willing  to 
allow  the  insurgents  to  buy  arms  and  ammunition  in  France, 
buti  he  would  not  advise  giving  them  money,  for  that  would  be  a 
breach  of  neutrality  with  England.8  He  insinuated,  however, 
that  they  might  be  put  in  the  way  of  receiving  money  indirectly.9 

To  these  propositions  Vergennes  was  not  opposed  although  he 
wished  a  different  outcome.  He  hoped  the  American  r.rdnm'ps  woiildjie- 
feat  England.  In  his  memorial10  early  in  1775,  Vergennes  told  the  King 
that  France  should  see  to  it  that  the  colonies  defeat  England.  They 
should  be  encouraged  to  believe  that  France  would  aid  them  if  they 
succeeded  in  the  next  campaign.  This  would  not  embroil  France  with 
England,  nor  compromise  her  with  the  colonies  as  yet.  "Thus,  al- 
though France  was  at  peace  with  England  in  1775,  Vergennes  and 
Turgot  alike  assumed  an  attitude  of  hostility.  They  did  so  simiply,  nat- 
urally, almost  without  apology.  Whatever  was  worse  for  their  rival  was 
better  for  them."11  The  colonies  were  to  be  helped  in  order  to  hurt 
England.  There  was  one  person  in  France  who  needed  to  be  con- 
vinced by  Turgot  and  Vergennes  in  order  to  have  their  policy  made  the 
controlling  policy  of  the  French  Government.  That  was  the  king. 
Louis  XVI.  He  had  no  love  for  the  colonies,12  In  fact,  he  positively 
dislike?  them  as  repels  against  a  sovereign.  "He13_ 

minded.  Though  humane  and  desirous  of 
doing  ,good  in  general,  he  could  not  hold  philosophical  or  general  ideas, 
such  as  those  gradually  permeating  all  French  society  at  that  time  un- 
der the  impulse  of  Voltaire  the  teacher  and  Rousseau,  the  preacher." 
He  had  no  sympathy  with  the  colonies  in  their  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence, he  dreaded  the  effect  of  its  outcome,  and  yet  he  was  willing  to 
help  them  in  order  to  hurt  England.  Every  letter  and  message  from 
Beaumarchais  at  this  time  showed  his  keen  insight  into  the 
workings  of  the  king's  mind.  He  knew  that  Louis  XVI  was 
not  a  man  to  be  persuaded  easily  to  use  underhand  schemes,  bald- 
ly and  boldly  proposed.14  The  "memorials"  that  Louis  received 
from  Beaumarchais  were  therefore  couched  in  noble,  serious 
terms.  They  reviewed  the  humiliating  position  of  France  after 
the  losses  of  the  Seven  Years  War,  with  insistent  mention  of  the  "Dun- 


7.  See  Durand,  pp.  1-16  for  Bonvoulolr's  letters  and  information  in  1775  which  may 

have  suggested   this. 

8.  N.   C.   H.   p.  25. 

9.  N.   C.  H.   p.  25,  foot  note  2. 

10.  Lorn,  quoted   in  Dur.  pp.   45-8. 

11.  N.   C.   H.  p.  26. 

12.  Dur.   p.  45. 

13.  Dur.  p.  44-45. 

14.  Stille,  p.  16,  speaks  of  Beaumarchais's  usurping  the  functions  of  the  minister? 

in  giving  advice. 

18 


kirk  disgrace."15  They  showed  him  that  public  faith  in  keeping  a 
treaty16  was  different  from  private  honor  in  keeping  a  promise.  The 
King  was  urged  to  think  of  his  nation,  his  kingdom,  rather  than  of 
his  private  scruples.17  He  was  made  to  feel  the  solemn  responsibility  of 
decision  in  this  matter,18  and  to  look  upon  it  as  a  question  of  national 
preservation. 

King  Louis  XVI  was  not  proof  against  this  argument  which  fell 
in  line  with  his  secret,  innermost  hatred  and  fear  of  his  rival.  He  was 
influenced  by  the  decision  of  Charles  III  of  Spain,  who,  through  Grim- 
aldi,  minister  of  foreign  affairs  at  the  Spanish  court,  made  a  proposi- 
tion to  share  with  France  the  expense  of  sending  money  secretly  to 
the  rebels.19  These  kings  agreed  in  their  desire  to  see  England  hu- 
miliated, and  to  aid  the  American  colonies  secretly  as  a  means  of 
bringing  this  about. 

Louis  XVI  seems  to  have  become  convinced  that  secrecy  could  be 
maintained.  Beaumarchais  and  Vergennes  sought  to  give  assurance 
that  if  the  French  government  aided  the  colonies  it  could  be  upon  the 
express  stipulation  that  they  should  not  bring  their  prizes  into  French 
ports,  nor  reveal  by  word  or  act  the  aid  furnished,  upon  penalty  of  for- 
feiture.20 "Your  majesty  knows  better  than  anyone  that  secrecy  is 
the  soul  of  business  and  that  in  politics  a  project  known  is  a  project 
lost,"21  wrote  Beaumarchais. 

Just  at  this  juncture,  Turgot  and  Malesherbes,  whose  judicial  atti- 
tude had  troubled  the  king  in  other  affairs,  were  removed  from  the  min- 
istry. This  diminished  the  weight  of  the  "party  of  prudence."22  Then 
the  king  accepted  Vergennes's  policy.  He  agreed  to  the  plan  proposed 
by  Vergennes,  originally  inspired  by  Beaumarchais,  but  later  drawn 
up  in  due  form  and  sent  to  him  in  London.  Briefly  summarized,23 
the  following  are  the  propositions  of  the  French  government  to  give 
secret  aid  to  the  American  colonies. 

1.  The  aspect  of  a  speculation24  on  the  part  of  an  individual  to 
which  the  French  government  were  strangers,  was  to  be  maintained 
throughout. 

2.  To  appear  so,  it  must  be  so,  up  to  a  certain  point. 

3.  The  French  government  would  give  one  million  francs. 


15.  Lorn.   p.    259. 

16.  Dur.  pp.   65,   67-8. 

17.  Lorn.  pp.  264-5. 

18.  Dur.  p.  60. 

19.  N.  C.  H.  p.  26. 

20.  Beaumarchais's  letter  Dur.  p.  88. 

21.  Ib.   p.   95. 

22.  N.  C.  H.  p.  26  Per.  Vol..  11.,  p.  263. 

23.  Quoted  In  Dur.  p.  87-8  Lomenie  stated  it  thus:  In  N.  Am.  Rev.  Vol.  LXXXIV, 

p.    137.     Lomfinie's    authority    for    these    propositions    and    agreements    is 
challenged  as  unproved. 

24.  Pitkin:     Polit.   &  Civ.  Hist,   of  U.   S.,  Vol.  I,  p.   403. 

19 


4.  It  would  influence  Spain  to  give  an  equal  sum. 

5.  Beaumarchais  would  ask  otjher  parties  to  subscribe  to  his  en- 
terprise. 

6.  Beaumarchais  would  establish  a  large  commercial  house,  and, 
at  his  own  risk  and  peril,  he  could  supply  America  with  arms,  am- 
munition, etc.  £<  <     'a    x-  c*,  &&& 

7.  The  French  arsenals  would  deliver  to  this  company  arms  and 

ammunition  to  be  replaced  or  paid  for.   ' 
.  . 

8.  Beaumarchais  and  his  company  were  not  to  demand  money 

of  the  Americans  but  produce  of  their  soil ;  such  pay  was  to  be  distrib- 
uted throughout  the  kingdom  and  the  enterprise  would  become  self- 
supporting. 

9.  The  French  government  was  to  reserve  the  right  to  favor  or 
oppose  the  company,  according  to  political  contingencies. 

10.  Beaumarchais  was  to  render  to  the  French  government  an  ac- 
count of  the  profits  and  losses  of  the  enterprise.25 

11.  The  French  government  was  to  decide  whether  to  grant  new 
contributions  or  discharge  the  company  from  all  obligations  previously 
sanctioned. 

On  June  10,  17/6,  the  French  government  through  Yergennes  paid 
over  the  million  francs  and  Beaumarchais  gave  his  receipt.  When 
Silas  Deane  appeared  in  Paris  as  the  accredited  agent  of  the  American 
colonies,  and  applied  to  the  French  government  for  aid,  Yergennes  told 
him20  that  "France  could  not  openly  encourage  the  shipping  of  warlike 
stores  to  America,  but  that  no  obstruction  would  be  raised."  He 
took  Deane  under  his  personal  protection,  warned  him  to  be  aware  of 
spies,  of  the  English  ambassador  who  knew  of  his  arrival,  and  then 
sent  him  to  Beaumarchais  as  the  proper  man  with  whom  to  deal. 

When,  however,  B'eaumarchais's  'incognito  was  penetrated  at 
Havre,27  and  suspicion  was  likely  to  be  thrown  upon  the  French  govern- 
ment, it  countermanded  its  permission  to  allow  officers  and  engineers28 
to  embark  with  the  stores  which  the  firm  of  Roderieue  Hortalez  & 
Company  were  sending  to  the  French  colonies  in  the  West  Indies.29 
This  action  of  Yergennes  satisfied  Lord  Stormont,  the  Eng- 
lish ambassador  to  France,  who,  suspicious  of  the  real  destination  of 
the  ships,  had  made  the  protest  and  the  officers  were  finally  allowed  to 
depart. 

Between  1776  and  1778,  the  French  government  more  than  once 


25.  There  was  nothing  in   this   set   of  propositions   nor  in  the  receipts  given  for 

money    received    from    the    French    government,    which    suggested    that 
Beaumarchais  was  ever  to  repay  this  sum. 

26.  N.   C.  H.   pp.   29-30. 

27.  Lorn.  pp.  291-3. 

28.  Our.   pp.   105-6. 

20.     L,om.    p.    29    &    Dur.    106. 

20 


denied  giving  any  aid  to  the  colonies,  admitting  only  the  fact  that 
Beaumarchais  had  been  allowed  to  make  a  portion  of  his  purchases  at 
the  royal  arsenals.30  Whether  the  French  government  made  Silas 
Deane  believe  this  denial,  or  whether  he  saw  through  the  ruse,  will 
perhaps  never  be  settled.31  It  is  certain  that  he  accepted  condi- 
tions as  he  found  them,  followed  the  cue  given  him  by  Vergennes, 
and  tried  to  make  Lee  and  Franklin  do  the  same. 

Further  than  this  the  French  government  could  not  go  without 
declaring  war  upon  England,  or  giving  England  just  cause  tor  declaring" 
-Av7ir  upon  i-rancer  ^ctory  ot  tne  lonunenral 

arms  at  Saratoga  made  it  seem  probable  that  the  colonies  would  "win, 
ttspgoiallv  wjth  1'rpnHi  a  iff  that-  thp  Frpnpfo  government  declared  itself. 
Up  to  this  time  it  had  not  even  given  formal  recognition  to  the  Ameri- 
can commissioners  in  Paris,  nor  answered  their  questions  about  Rod- 
erigue  Hortalez  &  Co.,  of  whose  existence  it  was  supposed  to  be  ig- 
norant.82 

The  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  was  made  in  February,88  1778, 
and  Gerard  de  Rayneval  was  sent  as  minister  to  the  United  States.  It 
was  to  him  that  Vergennes  wrote  the  answers  which  he  should  make 
to  the  American  commissioners  in  Paris,  and  ordered  this  minister  in 
Philadelphia  to  advise  Congress  of  them.^ 

TheM-  ;m>\vers  were  to  questions  put  by  a  puzzled  American  Con- 
gress to  the  French  government  as  to  whether  they  owed  gratitude84 
to  the  French  King  for  gifts  of  stores  and  ammunition,  or  money  to 
the  mythical,  mysterious  firm  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co.,  represented 
l>y  Beaumarchais. 

To  this  query,  Vergennes  said  he  should  reply  that  the  king  had 
not  furnished  anything ;  that  he  had  allowed  Beaumarchais  to  buy  stores  / 
from  the  arsenals,  or  to  take  them  on  condition  of  replacement.35    He 
added  that  he  would  gladly  interpose  in  order  that  the  colonies  should 
not  be  pressed  for  the  payment  for  the  military  supplies. 

To  the  second  query  of  the  Commissioners,  as  to  whether  or  no 
they  should  ratify  the  new  contract  made  with  Beaumarchais's  firm, 


Vergennes  replied  that  he  could  not  vouch  for  it  as  he  did  not  know 
it. 

This  open  disavowal  and  implied  endorsement  of  Beaumarchais's 
movements  satisfied  Congress  for  the  first  time,  and  for  the  time  being, 
that  they  owed  Beaumarchais.  John  Jay,  as  president  of  the  Contin* 


30.  Bol.  p.  224. 

31.  N.   C.   H.   p.    31. 

32.  Dur.  p.   132. 

S3.  Dur.  p.   130.  Cf.   Don.  Vol.  11.   p.   761. 

34.  Dur.    p.    130. 

35.  Quoted  in  Dur  p.  13*. 


21 


ental  Congress,  wrote  a  most  appreciative  letter36  to  Beaumarchais  and 
promised  payment  of  the  debt  due  him.37 

This  is  the  most  decided  action  the  French  royal  government  took 
during  the  war  to  secure  Beaumarchais  against  loss,  and  this  was 
certainly  vague  and  indirect.  His  importance  became  slight  com- 
jpared  with  its  own  in  American  affairs  from  1778  to  1783.  Mean- 
while in  1781,  by  a  mere  bit  of  inadvertence,  the  French  government 
said  it  had  already  given  the  United  States  the  sum  of  three  million 
francs.  Of  these  the  United  States  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  two 
only  which  came  through  the  hands  of  the  Banker  Grand  to  the  Ameri- 
can commissioners  in  Paris.  The  other  million,  then,  must  have  been 
given  to  Beaumarchais  and  so  to  them  indirectly.  If  so,  the  United 
States  did  not  indeed  wish  to  pay  the  sum  both  to  the  French  govern- 
ment and  to  its  long  suspected  agent.  This  million  of  francs  had 
evidently  been  given  as  a  considerable  nest-egg  for  the  commercial  un- 
dertaking which  was  to  supply  the  Americans  with  arms  in  order  to 
help  them  light  the  enemy  of  France.  The  personal  accounting  of 
Beaumarchais  to  the  king  is  even  now  in  existence,  endorsed  with 
"Bon"  in  Louis'  own  hand  writing.38  All  the  documents  or  letters 
reproduced  or  quoted  by  Lomenie  tend  to  prove  that  this  sum  was  in- 
tended39 and  actually  used  for  buying  arms  with  no  idea  of  repayment 
by  either  the  American  colonies  or  by  Beaumarchais.  In  1786  there 
was  an  attempt  to  adjust  the  account  between  the  French  and  United 
States  governments.  Vergennes  declared  that  the  United  States  was 
wrong  *°  in  considering  the  million  francs  paid  by  the  French  govern- 
ment in  1776  as  part-payment  of  the  United  States'  indebtedness  to 
Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co. ;  that  was  a  sum  for  which  Beaumarchais 
was  accountable  only  to  Vergennes.  This  brought  no  help  to  Beau- 
marchais, and  when,  three  years  later  the  French  Revolution  came,  it 
looked  as  if  there  would  be  little  chance  for  the  new  French  government 
to  interpose  in  behalf  of  these  claims.  Stille41  makes  much  of  what 
happened  at  just  this  juncture.  He  points  out  two  important  facts. 
First :  that  it  was  in  1794  that  the  receipt  was  found  in  the  French  treas- 
ury account  and  given  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  showing  that  Beaumar- 
chais had  received  the  sum,  unwittingly  mentioned  in  the  treaty  of 
1781.  Second,  that  by  a  combined  political  and  financial  deal  in 
1794,  Beaumarchais  made  himself  so  useful  to  Talleyrand  that  the  lat- 
ter pressed  his  claim  with  elaborate  diplomatic  subterfuges  which  were 


36.  Bettelheim,  pp.  375-6. 

37.  N.  C.  H.  p.  71. 

38.  Stilie,   p.   45. 

39.  The   claim   that    the   money   had    been    spent    for  an   object   which   had   been  a 

mystere  d«  cabinet  and  demanded  lasting  concealment  was  advanced  by 
Talleyrand.  Stille  (p.  36)  rests  much  of  his  arraignment  of  the  French 
government  upon  this. 

+0.     Dur.   p.   152. 

41.     Stille,   pp.   33,    36,   41-.'. 

22 


absolute  falsehoods.  The  question  raised  was  about  the  object  for 
which  the  "lost  million"  was  designed.  From  Talleyrand's  deal, 
Stille  deduces  his  grounds  for  blaming  the  French  government  in 
aiding  Beaumarchais  to  make  good  his  losses  by  "getting  the  sum  out" 
of  the  United  States  without  a  shadow  of  a  claim  since  it  was  not 
asked  as  a  charity  nor  as  an  indemnity.  Yet  even  after  1799,  "every 
successive  government42  in  France,  and  every  French  minister  to  the 
United  States,"  tried  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the  claims  for  Beaumar- 
chais's  heirs.  They  reiterated  in  general  Talleyrand's  opinion  that  "a 
French  citizen  who  risked  his  entire  fortune  to  help  the  Americans,  and 
whose  zeal  and  activity  were  so  essentially  useful  during  the  war  which 
gave  them  their  liberty  and  rank  among  nations,  might  unquestionably 
pretend  to  some  favor;  in  any  event  he  should  be  listened  to  when  he 
asks  for  nothing  but  good  faith  and  justice." 

I  have  quoted  this  in  full  for  it  shows  the  light  in  which  the 
French  government  regarded  Beaumarchais  and  his  services. 
This  clever  minister  and  his  predecessor,  Vergennes,  can  never  be  ac- 
cused, nor  yet  the  impersonal  French  government,  of  betraying  the  inter- 
ests of  Beaumarchais.  Even  he,  in  all  his  troubles  and  poverty,  seems 
never  to  have  felt  that  they  had  failed  to  keep  the  bargain  made  with 
him  when  he  set  up  his  firm  in  1/76,  in  order  to  further,  as  a  French 
citizen,  the  scheme  which  he  knew  his  king  and  the  French  government 
secretly  favored  but  could  never  openly  support. 


42.     Dur.  p.   155.   N.  C.  H.  p.    3^,   note. 


23 


IV. 

Position  and  Motives  of  Beaumarchais 


Beauraarchais  seems  to  have  been  a  distasteful  enigma  to  the  A- 
merican  government,  for  while  to  the  French  government  and 
even  to  the  French  nation,  as  far  as  they  knew  about  the 
affair,  the  action  of  Beaumarchais  in  risking  his  whole 
fortune  to  help  the  American  colonies,  was  neither  mysterious  nor 
inexplicable,  it  was  all  of  that  and  even  more  to  the  Continental  Con- 
gress, and  to  the  American  people  as  far  as  they,  in  turn,  knew  the 
details.  Even  today,  when  the  truth  is  known,  and  the  help  given  by 
Beaumarchais  is  more  fairly  estimated  by  historians,  the  average  A- 
merican  citizen  feels  neither  gratitude  nor  even  interest  in  the  man  who 
sent  his  ships  to  our  Revolutionary  forefathers  not  only  with  ammu- 
nition and  clothing,  but  with  Steuben  to  train  them,1  and  Count  Pulaski 
to  lead  them. 

Perhaps  the  American  people  are  not  wholly  unfair  and  wrong  in 
this  sentiment,  however,  and  if  a  whole  nation  seems  to  err,  it  is  not 
only  just  but  wise  to  search  carefully  for  reasons  before  indicting  it,  on 
mere  circumstantial  evidence.  We  must  consider  whether  Beaumarchais 
was  the  same  sort  of  unselfish  and  singleh carted  friend  to  our  American 
colonies  that  Lafayette  and  Steuben  were.  Was  he  worthy  of  a  lasting 
gratitude  which  could  not  be  cancelled  even  when  his  just  money 
claims  were  paid?  What  was  there  in  his  character,  his  life,  his  pro- 
fessions, his  actions,  which  roused  suspicions  in  the  mind  and  heart  of 
the  American  colonists  who  had  to  deal  with  him?  These  are  the  two 
questions2  which  are  answered  gradually  by  reading  the  details  of  his 
life  told  mostly  in  his  letters  and  memorials.  Out  of  his  own  mouth 
we  get  answers  to  our  queries. 

To  take  a  first  glance  here  at  Beaumarchais  as  he  appears  on  the 
stage  of  French- American  affairs  in  1775,  through  the  eyes  of  one 
writer,2  we  find  him  already  well  known  in  France  for  "he  had  made  a 
noise  in  the  world  with  his  quarrels,  law-suits,  pamphlets,  and  plays." 
He  was  "bold,  clever,  fond  of  speculation,  and  just  the  man  for  the  pur- 
poses of  Vergennes,"  the  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  "He  had 
already  been  employed  in  the  more  hidden  paths4  of  diplomacy  and  had 
shown  himself  quick-witted  and  adventurous."  His  most  zealous 
biographer,  Lomenie,  finds  other  traits  in  him  sufficiently  promi- 
nent to  inspire  both  Louis  XVI  of  France  and  Vergennes  to  entrust  to 
him  their  dangerous  and  delicate  operations.  He  credits  him  with 
capacity,  sagacity  and  prudence.  All  of  these  he  showed  in  the  affairs 
of  other  people  if  not  in  his  own. 


1.  Lorn.  p.  220  note.     Conway  rather  counterbalanced  the  help  of  the  others,  but 

Beaumarchais  was  not  to  blame  for  that. 

2.  Stille,  pp.  3-6. 

3.  Lowell  In  N.   C.  H.,  p.   27. 

4.  Pull  details  in  Lomenie,  pp.  206-258. 

27 


Whatever  indiscretions  are  apparent  in  the  conduct  of  his  own  af- 
fairs seem  to  have  come  from  his  thirst  for  notoriety.5  His  trial  in 
the  Goezman  case  for  bribing  the  judge  or  the  judge's  wife,  had  given 
him  such  a  good  opportunity  to  show  his  spirit  and  eloquence,  to  ap- 
peal to  the  popular  imagination  as  a  defender  of  the  weak  against  the 
strong,  that  he  came  out  of  it  not  only  more  widely  known  but  an 
object  of  idolatry  to  the  French  people  at  large.6  He  had 
been  declared  "blame"  however,  and  lost  his  civil  rights.  It  was  be- 
cause he  was  still  under  this  sentence  of  the  Parlement  of  Paris  that 
he  was  willing  to  undertake  any  mission,  any  adventure,  which  by  a 
successful  outcome  would  ingratiate  him  with  Louis  XV  and  later 
with  Louis  XVI  to  such  a  point  that  this  sentence  might  be  reversed. 

This  was  the  motive  \vhich  was  impelling  his  search  in  England  in 
1775  for  any  information  about  the  English  government's  relations  with 
its  rebellious  colonies.  To  be  of  service  in  giving  France  a  chance  to 
hurt  her  rival  in  secret  without  being  forced  to  pay  the  penalty  of  mak- 
ing a  war  she  could  ill  afford,  was  the  aim  which  actuated  Beaumar- 
chais  in  aiding  the  American  colonies  financially  in  the  Revolution. 

Underneath  all,  above  all,  through  all,  was  the  impelling  force  of 
a  desire  for  notoriety  and  applause.  The  first  concrete  aim  was  ac- 
complished in  1776.  The  second  by  a  strange  perversity  of  fate  was 
never  fulfilled  in  America,  for  here  he  was  never  generally  known  even 
in  name,  and  never  applauded,7  although  he  was  sufficiently  well  known 
by  the  leaders  of  the  Continental  and  later  Congresses  to  be  thoroughly 
suspected  as  a  self-seeking  trickster. 

This  was  in  part  due  to  the  prejudiced  statements  of  Arthur  Lee,8 
who  made  Beaumarchais's  acquaintance  in  London  in  1775,  and  to  those 
of-  Dr.  Dubourg9  of  Paris.  Both  of  these  men  were  rivals  of  Beau- 
marchais ;  the  former  for  fame  or  popularity,  the  latter  for  the  com- 
mercial enterprise  which  fell  into  his  opponent's  hands.  Lee  in  his  cha- 
grin at  not  being  able  to  claim  that  he  had  won  the  support  of  France, 
and  his  more  or  less  sincere  bewilderment  over  the  secret  dealings  of 
the  French  government  with  Beaumarchais  and  the  colonies,  influenced 
the  Continental  Congress  directly.10  Dr.  Dubourg  influenced  Ben- 
jamin Franklin  whom  he  had  met  sometime  before  in  England,  and 
welcomed  to  Paris  in  I776.11 

To  put  it  briefly,  Beaumarchais  in  1775  used  to  question  Arthur  Lee 
adroitly  about  American  conditions12  and  in  the  early  days,  when  he  was 


5.  Perkins:   France  under  Louis  XV,   Vol.  2,   p    314. 

6.  Perkins,   Vol.    2,   p.   318,   and  N.  C.   H.  p.   2S. 

7.  Even  John  Jay's   letter  of  gratitude  in  behalf  of  the  Continental  Congress  in 

1779  does  not  seem  to  qualify  this  statement  in  general.     Dur.  p.  134. 

8.  N.   C.   H  p.   28. 

9.  Lorn.    p.    280. 

10.  Lorn.   pp.   276-280. 

11.  Lorn.   pp.    280-284. 

12v  Dur.   pp.   42-3,   quotes   Doniol. 

28 


forming  his  vague  schemes  for  commercial  dealings,  he  discussed 
them  with  Lee.  Since  Lee  got  the  impression  then  that  the  business  firm 
was  a  mere  envelope  for  the  aid  to  be  given  to  America  by  the  French 
government,  he  always13  affirmed  thereafter  that  the  colonies  were  not 
indebted14  to  the  firm  of  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Company.  He  could 
not  influence  Silas  Deane,  however,  so  he  complained  of  him  to  the 
Continental  Congress  with  enough  force  and  grounds  for  this  agent 
to  be  recalled  from  Paris.15  Meanwhile  Dr.  Dubourg,  on  finding  that 
Beaumarchais  in  some  mysterious  way  was  being  made  an  unofficial 
tool  of  the  French  government  in  helping  the  colonies,  sent  a  letter 
of  remonstrance  to  Vergennes  on  the  plea  of  Beaumarchais' s  lack  of 
business  capacity  or  experience  and  his  alleged  immorality.16  He 
could  not  deter  Vergennes  from  his  plan  nor  force  him  to  acknowledge 
that  it  existed,  but  although  Vergennes  and  Beaumarchais  had  many  a 
laugh  at  Dr.  Dubourg's  jealous  intentions,  they  could  not  prevent  his 
influencing  Franklin,  and  through  him,  as  America's  "wise,  practical 
man,"  influencing  all  the  proceedings  of  the  Continental  Congress  in 
regard  to  their  dealings  with  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co. 

Of  the  three  American  commissioners  with  whom  Beaumarchais 
had  to  deal,  he  made  a  favorable  impression  upon  only  one,  Silas  Deane. 
He  had  shown  himself  throughout  all  his  life  very  shrewd  and  success- 
ful in  reading  the  minds,17  understanding  the  temper  and  influencing 
the  judgments  of  his  fellow  Frenchmen.  But  he  did  not  seem  to  un- 
derstand the  American  colonists,  especially  the  Yankees.  He  did  not 
even  suspect  the  role  he  ought  to  assume  to  gain  their  confidence. 
He  could  not  realize  that  to  these  non-theatre-goers,  a  playwright  must 
be  in  close  touch  with  the  devil  himself;  he  could  not  have  suspected 
that  his  facetious  and  unbusinesslike  letters18  condemned  him 
again  and  again.  Lomenie,  his  biographer,  understood  the  character  of 
the  colonists  better.  "Only  imagine  serious  Yankees,  who  had  near- 
ly all  been  traders  before  becoming  soldiers,  receiving  masses  of  car- 
goes, which  were  frequently  embarked  by  stealth  during  the  night,  and 
the  invoices  of  which  consequently  presented  some  irregularities,  and 
all  this  without  any  other  letters  of  advice  than  the  rather  fantastic 
missives  signed  with  the  romantic  name  of  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co. : 
in  which  Beaumarchais  mixed  up  protestations  of  enthusiasm,  offers 
of  unlimited  service  and  political  advice,  with  applications  for  tobacco, 


13.  N.    Amer.    Rev.    LXXXIV,    p.    138.      In    July,    177'J,    Lee    declared    himself    not 

absolutely   sure   about   Beaumarchais   and    said    he   would   give    him    the 
benefit  of  the  doubt.     This  seems  like  a  condemning  pardon. 

14.  Lee,  Vindication,  p.  15. 

15.  Lowell,  in  N.  C.  H.,  p.  47,  speaks  of  John  Adams'  letters  expressing  his  belief 

that   Lee   was   honest.     He   adds:     "Of   this,    there   can    be  little  doubt. 
It  was  Lee's  judgment  and  temper  that  were  in  fault." 

16.  Lorn.  p.  281. 

17.  Bet.  p.  379. 

18.  Lorn.   pp.    296-7. 


indigo,  or  salt  fish,  and  ended  with  such  tirades  as  this  one  which  we 
may  take  as  typical : — 'Gentlemen,19  consider  my  house  as  the  head  of 
all  operations  useful  to  your  cause  in  Europe,  and  myself  as  the  most 
zealous  partisan  of  your  nation,  the  soul  of  your  successes,  and  a  man 
profoundly  filled  with  the  respectful  esteem  with  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  be,  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co.'  ' 

I  have  quoted  this  vivid  and  sympathetic  explanation  from  Lo- 
menie  for  it  seems  the  key  to  much  of  the  misunderstanding  of  Beau- 
marchais's  troubles  with  the  Continental  Congress.  But  this  fantastic, 
popular  hero  in  business,  though  not  a  real  merchant,  was  no  fool. 
By  1777  he  had  come  to  the  point  of  understanding  that  the  colonies 
would  not  pay  their  debt  to  him  unless  he  appealed  to  something  more 
than  their  honor.  He  sent  De  Francy20  "with  the  double  mission  of 
obtaining  justice  from  Congress  for  the  past,  and  preventing  for  the  fu- 
ture his  cargoes  from  being  gratuitously  delivered."21  The  new  con- 
tract made  with  the  United  States  in  1778  sounds  thoroughly  business- 
like22 but  "does  not  calm  the  troubled  waters.  Shipments  continue  un- 
der its  provisions  but  payment  for  them  is  not  made  by  Congress." 
Beaumarchais's  efforts  remained  unappreciated  and  his  financial  out- 
lays were  not  reimbursed. 

The  more  one  becomes  acquainted  with  the  life  and  temper  of  this 
man,  shown  so  clearly  by  his  letters  and  published  works,  one  feels 
that  some  trouble,  some  conditions  likely  to  arouse  sympathy,  were  vital- 
ly necessary  to  him.  Having  taken  for  his  motto  "My  life  is  a  com- 
bat,"23 he  had  to  be  in  difficulties  to  live  up  to  it.  The  only  time  that 
bewilderment  and  despair  seem  to  creep  into  his  journals  and  letters  is 
when  as  a  young  man  he  is  a  captive  in  an  Austrian  prison,  thrust  in 
there  by  the  orders  of  Maria  Theresa  and  unable  to  make  his  voice 
heard  by  a  sympathizing  public.24.  Like  Judge  Dandin25  in  Racine's 
"Les  Plaideurs,"  he  wished  to  be  ill,  and  like  Orgon  in  Moliere's 
"Tartuffe,"26  he  didn't  want  to  be  loved,  if  the  price  he  had  to  pay 
was  being  like  other  people,  bound  by  ordinary  conventions  or  rules 
of  life.  This  fact  was  not  only  the  cause  of  much  of  his  trouble  in 
life,  but  was  also  one  which  he  himself  recognized.  De  Lomenie27 
gives  a  hitherto  unpublished  document  in  which  Beaumarchais  accounts 
for  his  combats  in  life. 


19.  Quoted  in  Lorn.  p.  297. 

20.  Lorn.  p.  298. 

21.  Loon.   pp.    298-302. 

22.  Dur.  pp.  119-131. 

23.  Lorn.  p.   290. 

24.  Lorn.   pp.   220-2. 

25.  Les  Plaideurs,  Act.  I,   Sc.  IV. 

26.  Tartuffe,  Act  II,  Sc.  II. 

27.  Lorn.  pp.  456-7. 


30 


"With  gayety,  and  even  bonhommie  I  have  had  enemies  without 
number,  and  have  nevertheless  never  crossed,  or  even  taken  the  path 
of  another  person.  By  dint  of  reasoning  with  myself  I  have  discovered 
the  cause  of  so  much  hostility,  in  fact,  it  is  natural  enough. 


"I  composed  verses,  songs,  but  who  would  recognize  me  as  a  poet? 
I  was  the  son  of  a  watchmaker.  I  have  treated  with  ministers  on  the 
subject  of  great  points  of  reform  of  which  our  finances  were  in  need, 
but  people  said,  'What  is  he  interfering  in  ?  This  man  is  nqt  a  finan- 
cier.' 


"I  have  traded  in  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe,  but  I  was  not  a 
regular  merchant.  I  had  forty  ships  at  sea  at  one  time ;  but  I  was  not 
a  shipowner,  and  I  was  calumniated  in  all  our  sea-ports." 


"And  nevertheless,  of  all  Frenchmen,  whoever  they  may  be,  I 
am  the  one  who  has  done  mast  for  the  liberty  of  America,  the  beget- 
ter of  our  own ;  for  I  was  the  only  person  who  dared  to  form  the  plan 
and  commence  its  execution,  in  spite  of  England,  Spain,  and  even  of 
France;  but  I  did  not  belong  to  the  class  of  negotiators,  and  I  was  a 
stranger  in  the  bureaus  of  the  ministers." 


"What  was  I  then?  I  was  nothing  but  mvself,  and  myself  I  have 
remained,  free  in  the  midst  of  fetters,  calm  in  the  greatest  of  dangers, 
making  head  against  all  storms,  directing  speculations  with  one  hand 
and  war  with  the  other ;  as  lazy  as  an  ass  and  always  working ;  the 
object  of  a  thousand  calumnies,  but  happy  in  my  home,  having  never 
belonged  to  any  coterie,  either  literary,  or  political,  or  mystical ;  having 
never  paid  court  to  anyone,  and  yet  repelled  by  all." 


31 


V. 

Position  of  the  Continental  Congress 


VI. 

Misunderstandings  and  Consequences 


It  need  not  seem  strange  that  the  Continental  Congress  at  Philadel- 
phia, so  far  removed  both  spiritually  and  physically  from  Paris,  was 
mystified  by  the  enforced  secrecy  of  the  French  government,  misled  by 
the  prejudiced  statements  of  Arthur  Lee,  and  puzzled  into  determined 
suspicion  of  the  solitary,  unconventional  Beaumarchais.  It  seems  use- 
less to  blame  them,  unjust  even  to  criticise  them,  unless  we  are  sure 
that  we  should  have  seen  more  clearly  in  their  place.  We  need  not 
only  to  know  the  conditions  under  which  they  worked,  but  even  to  share 
them  through  an  eager  sympathy,  born  of  imagination  and  fed  upon 
a  close  study  of  details. 

Of  the  many  unbusinesslike  committees  of  the  Continental  Con- 
gress, perhaps  none  was  worse  than  the  one  entrusted  with  foreign  af- 
fairs. It  sent  Arthur  Lee  to  London  on  one  mission  and  expected 
him  to  get  news  and  information  about  another.  It  sent  to  the  French 
court,  Silas  Deane,  a  Connecticut  Yankee  who  could  not  speak  French, 
and  had  him  assume  the  role  of  a  merchant  though  he  never  showed 
any  business  ability,  nor  passed  anywhere  for  a  trader.  The  commit- 
tee and  the  whole  Congress  relied  upon  the  information  sent  by  the  ir- 
regular channel  which  Lee  provided,  rather  than  upon  that  furnished 
by  Deane,  their  accredited  agent.1  It  seems  but  natural,  however, 
that  they  should  have  accepted  the  judgment  of  Benjamin  Franklin  in 
the  case  of  Beaumarchais,  even  when  it  conflicted  with  that  of  either 
Lee  or  Deane. 

Again,  it  was  most  natural  that  the  members  of  the  Continental 
Congress  should  be  misled  by  the  statements  of  Vergennes,  the  French 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  when  he  disavowed  aiding  the  Americans 
with  supplies,  or  even  knowing  Roderigue  Hortalez  &  Co.,2  at  the  same 
time  promising  the  colonies  that  he  would  see  to  it  that  they  were  not 
pressed  for  payment  by  that  mysterious  firm.  Their  suspicion  became 
a  confirmed  belief  a  few  years  later  when  the  French  government  open- 
ly declared  war  against  England  and  gave  generous  aid  publicly  to  the 
United  States.  They  said  then  without  hesitation  that  this  was  a 
mere  continuation  of  the  aid  given  indirectly  in  the  past  under  cover 
of  the  fictitious  firm's  dealings.3 

Believing  Arthur  Lee's  charges  of  duplicity  and  graft  on  the  part 
of  Deane,  the  Continental  Congress  would  give  no  credit  to  the  latter's 
protestations  when  he  declared  that  he  had  solemnly  pledged  the  honor 
of  the  United  States  to  pay  just  debts  contracted  with  Beaumarchais. 
They  got  another  calumniating  statement  against  their  unknown  helper, 
from  Ducoudray,  the  French  officer  who  was  enraged  at  a  reprimand 


1.  N.  C.  H.  pp.  26  and  32.     Bol.  p.  224. 

2.  Bol.   p.   228.     N.   C.   H..   pp.   29.   31. 

3.  Stilie.  p.  6;  Bol.  pp.  228  and  240;  N.  C.  H.  p.  27. 

35 


given  him  by  Beaumarchais  for  his  actions  on  board  the  Amphitrite.4 
They  believed  the  story  without  waiting  to  hear,  or  even  to  consider 
that  there  might  be  another  side.  The  story  fell  in  line  with  that  gen- 
eral impression  which  was  given  to  Franklin  by  his  friend  Dubourg, 
and  duly  transmitted  to  them.  They  found  it  easy  to  believe  almost 
anything  strange  about  the  far  away  Beaumarchais.  We  have  al- 
ready spoken  of  his  unbusinesslike,  fantastic  letters  to  Congress,  and 
we  may  well  imagine  that  the  impression  which  they  gave  tended  to 
widen  rather  than  to  bridge  the  distance  which  was  opened  by  the  racial 
differences  of  temperament  and  tongue  between  them. 

The  American  nation,  as  far  as  it  knew  or  thoueht  anything 
about  the  claims  of  Beaumarchais,  agreed  with  the  Continental  Con- 
gress. It  felt  that  the  French  nation  was  in  sympathy  with  it.  Any 
men,  who  thought  definitely  on  the  subject,  argued  that  they  had  asked 
help  of  the  French  government,  that  aid  had  come  from  France,  and 
that  it  must  have  come  in  direct  response  from  the  body  to  which 
they  had  appealed.  The  child-like  character  of  this  reasoning  seems  out 
of  place  in  the  minds  of  our  "wise  men  of  the  nation."  They  were 
poor,  they  were  staggering  under  financial  burdens.  They  had  lost 
not  only  some  of  their  wisdom  but  also  some  of  their  honesty.  They 
argued  themselves  into  believing  in  1780  that  it  was  fair  to  repudiate 
thirty-nine-fortieths  of  the  face  value  of  national  bills  of  credit.5  They 
learned  to  suspect  others  in  financial  dealings.  In  Beaumarchais,  the 
Continental  Congress  came  to  see  a  trickster,6 — sane  or  insane,  friend- 
ly or  unfriendly,  they  couldn't  tell  which, — who  seemed  to  be  planning 
to  get  money  out  of  the  United  States,  now  almost  a  beggar  among 
the  nations.  Though  they  felt  he  was  not  to  be  trusted  nor  paid,  they 
could  not  bring  themselves  to  refuse  his  aid  nor  to  refrain  from 
asking  it  again  and  again  in  the  form  of  business  orders  for  more  cloth- 
ing and  ammunition.  His  case  seemed,  in  short,  to  the  Continental 
Congress,  a  matter  to  be  pushed  into  the  background  until  a  more  fa- 
vorable time  should  give  them  leisure  to  investigate  his  trickery  or  his 
claims. 

When  the  Revolutionary  War  was  over  in  1783  the  United  States 
had  so  many  debts  to  pay  and  so  many  claims  to  investigate,  that  their 
financial  problems  would  have  been  most  difficult  to  solve  even  if  they 
had  been  on  a  sound  money  basis  and  if  their  accounts  had  been  strictly 
kept.  The  deplorable  condition  of  their  currency  was  a  patent  fact  which 
demanded  attention.  The  domestic  debt  and  that  to  foreign  govern- 
ments had  to  be  settled  first.  Having  reason  to  believe  that  Silas 


4.  Dur.  p.   106-7. 

5.  Bullock,  pp.  71-2. 

6.  Stilie,    p.    6! 


Deane's  accounts  both  with  the  French  government  and  with  Beau- 
marchais  had  been  badly  kept,  they  sent  Barclay  to  revise  them.  All  the 
French  debts  seemed  like  vague  monsters.  He  found  that  the  French 
government  had  loaned  the  United  States  24,000,000  francs  between 
1778  and  1783.  Besides  this  sum,  various  gifts  and  some  advances  had 
been  made  which  we  now  know  had  amounted  to  13,000,000  francs. 
Of  these,7  however,  only  9,000,000  francs  were  enumerated  in  the  con- 
tract between  United  States  and  France  in  1784.  This  statement  in- 
cluded the  3,000,000  francs  given  before  1778  and  6,000,000  in  1781. 
It  omitted  2,000,000  given  in  1782  and  2,000,000  of  the  3,000,000  given 
to  Beaumarchais,  i.  e.,  the  1,000.000  from  the  Farmers-General  in  1776, 
and  the  1,000,000  given  in  three  installments  in  1777.  It  may  be 
that  Beaumarchais  had  returned  the  1,000,000  of  1777  ^d  that  they 
felt  the  advance  from  the  Farmers-General,  having  been  only  partially 
paid,  might  better  be  set  aside  by  the  French  Treasury  as  a  bad  debt. 

Now,  of  all  this  money  the  United  States  acknowledged  receiving 
the  24,000,000  livres  loaned  and  Dr.  Franklin  admitted  that  12,000,000 
livres  had  been  presented.  This  was  the  indebtedness  of  the  United 
States  to  France.  As  for  Beaumarchais's  account,  Barclay  decided 
that  it  was  3,600,000.  In  the  summer  of  1787,  Beaumarchais  wrote 
to  the  President  of  the  Continental  Congress  :  "I  dare  hope,  sir,  that 
touched  by  the  importance  of  the  affair,  and  by  the  force  of  my  rea- 
sons, you  will  do  me  the  favor  of  honoring  me  with  an  official  answer 
as  to  the  course  which  the  honorable  Congress  will  determine  upon — 
whether  to  verify  my  account  quickly  and  pay  on  that  verification  like 
any  just  sovereign,  or  at  length  to  appoint  arbitrators  in  Europe  to 
decide  the  points.  .  . ;  or  finally  to  write  to  me,  without  equivocation 
that  the  sovereigns  of  America,  forgetting  my  past  services,  refuse  me 
all  justice." 

In  response  to  this  appeal  the  Continental  Congress  sent  Arthur 
Lee,  Beaumarchais's  personal  enemy,  to  revise  the  old  account.  He 
decided  that  Beaumarchais  actually  owed  the  United  States  1,800,000 
francs.  Although  this  would  apparently  end  the  matter  unless  the 
Continental  Congress  began  to  press  Beaumarchais  for  payment,  the 
matter  came  up  again  in  the  first  Congress  of  the  United  States,  after 
the  old  Continental  Congress  which  had  contracted  the  debt,  had 
given  up  the  reins  of  government.  Alexander  Hamilton,  as  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  decided  that  Beaumarchais  was  still  the  legitimate 
Creditor  of  the  United  States  for  2,280,000  francs.8  If,  however,  the 
receipt  for  the  1,000,000  francs  given  by  the  French  government  to 


7.  N.  C.  H.  p.  71.     cf.  Bol. 

8.  For  this  reference  to  Hamilton's  investigation  I  cannot  find  the  original  state- 

ment.    Cf.  N.  C.  H.  p.  71  and  Lam.  p.  332. 

37 


Beaumarchais  in  1776  and  inadvertently  mentioned  in  1778,  should  be 
found,  that  1,000,000  francs  should  be  deducted.  This  receipt  was 
found  in  1794  when  Gouverneur  Morris,  as  minister  to  France,  made 
a  determined  search.  Beaumarchais,  however,  still  maintained  that 
he  had  never  received  either  "1,000,000  or  a  single  shilling  from  King 
Louis  XVI,  from  his  ministers,  or  from  any  person  in  the  world  to  be 
presented  as  a  gift  to  the  American  people."9  The  next  year  Beau- 
marchais died. 

Since  the  final  settlement  was  not  made  until  1835,  and  then  by  a 
Congress  representing  a  generation  which  knew  the  Revolutionary  War 
only  as  history,  and  with  merely  the  heirs  of  Beaumarchais,  the  minute 
details  need  not  concern  us  here.  I  confess  that  by  studying  the  records 
of  debates  in  Congress10  and  the  seemingly  well  founded  decisions  of 
historians,  contradicted  as  they  are  by  Stille's  able  but  unconvincing  ar- 
gument, I  do  not  know  how  much  the  American  government  of  1835 
owed  to  the  heirs  of  Beaumarchais.  I  cannot  tell  how  far  the  "faible 
part"  paid  came  short  of  what  was  due.  I  cannot  help  feeling,  however, 
that  the  spirit  if  not  the  letter  of  the  law  demanded  that  our  rich  power- 
ful nation,  which  in  1835  was  demanding  immediate  satisfaction  for  the 
French  Spoliation  Claims  for  damages  done  to  American  shipping  after 
1800,  could  have  done  a  nobler  thing  by  allowing  the  French  govern- 
ment to  set  off  against  these  claims  of  American  citizens  at  least  the 
sum  of  2,280,000  francs,  which  was  Hamilton's  estimate,  instead  of 
only  800,000  francs,  for  Beaumarchais's  heirs.  The  American  Con- 
gress may  have  made  a  strictly  honest  settlement,  but  it  could  bring 
America  neither  praise  nor  gratitude. 

Until  Lomenie's  biography  of  Beaumarchais  appeared  in  1857 
and  was  discussed  in  the  North  American  Review  of  that  same  year, 
probably  few  Americans  gave  any  thought  to  the  claims  or  to  the 
sorry  treatment  of  Beaumarchais  at  the  hands  of  our  government.  The 
same  state  of  affairs  remains  true  in  general  today.  From  the  re- 
search that  has  been  given  to  the  subject  in  recent  years,  and  from  the 
sincere  effort  made  to  understand  the  relations  of  all  three  parties  con- 
cerned,— the  French  government,  Beaumarchais,  and  the  Continental 
Congress — during  the  American  Revolution,  it  can  be  fairly  expected 
that  gradually  there  will  filter  down  into  the  minds  of  the  ordinary 
students  and  of  every  child  in  the  schools  of  the  United  States,  a  com- 
prehension of  the  real  nature  of  the  services  of  Beaumarchais  to  the 
struggling  colonies. 

This  can  be  done  without  blaming  the  Continental  Congress  un- 
duly or  blindly,  and  without  mistaking  Beaumarchais  for  an  unselfish 


9.     Lorn.  p.  331  quotes  this  letter  from  an  unpublished  memorial  of  Beaumarchais. 
10.     Annals   of  Cong.     1816   &   1824.     Cong.   Globe,   1835. 

38 


hero-martyr  who  failed  to  receive  the  rewards  which  he  most  desired  in 
return  for  his  aid.  These  he  found  and  enjoyed,  for  not  only  was  his  fu- 
ture claim  for  protection  at  the  hands  of  the  rampant  Republicans  pro- 
vided by  his  aid  to  the  cause  of  a  republic,  and  of  liberty,  but  for  the  im- 
mediate present  his  civil  rights  were  restored  and  he  had  a  chance  to 
play  a  leading-  role  on  the  world's  stage  in  the  time  of  the  revolutionary 
struggles  of  both  Europe  and  America.  Like  John  Wilkes  of  London,  he 
gave  to  the  cause  in  which  he  enlisted  a  real  impetus  and  substantial  aid 
without  being,  himself,  a  man  of  intrinsic  moral  worth. 


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